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ABSTRACT
Two currently active strands of research on logics for multi-agent
systems are dynamic epistemic logic, focusing on the epistemic
consequences of actions, and logics of coalitional ability, focusing
on what coalitions of agents can achieve by cooperating strategi-
cally. In this paper we make a ﬁrst attempt to bridge these topics by
considering the question: “what can a coalition achieve by public
announcements?”. We propose, ﬁrst, an extension of public an-
nouncement logic with constructs of the form hGiϕ, where G is a
set of agents, with the intuitive meaning that G can jointly make an
announcement such that ϕ will be true afterwards. Second, we con-
sider a setting where all agents can make (truthful) announcements
at the same time, and propose a logic with a construct h[G]iϕ, mean-
ing that G can jointly make an announcement such that no matter
what the other agents announce, ϕ will be true. The latter logic is
closely related to Marc Pauly’s Coalition Logic.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems;
I.2.4 [Knowledge representation formalisms and methods]
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Dynamic epistemic logic, coalition logic, public announcements
1. INTRODUCTION
Analysis of the dynamics of knowledge have received some at-
tention recently (see [13] for an overview). Van Benthem [11] and
Balbiani et al. [3] suggested an interpretation of the standard di-
amond where 3ϕ means “there is an announcement after which
ϕ.” This was in a setting going back to the Fitch-paradox [4].
Fitch observed that “there is an unknown truth” is inconsistent with
“all truths are knowable”. Consider some such “p is true and un-
known”, formally p ∧ ¬Kp, and the requirement that all truths
are knowable, “q → 3Kq”, for that truth. From p ∧ ¬Kp and
(p ∧ ¬Kp) → 3K(p ∧ ¬Kp) follows that at some future stage,
K(p∧¬Kp) will be true: an inconsistency in a setting where knowl-
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edge is at least introspective, because then both Kp and ¬Kp will
follow.
The new interpretation of the diamond 3 in the Fitch setting
ﬁrstly interprets 3ϕ as ‘sometime later, ϕ’, and secondly speciﬁes
this temporal speciﬁcation as what may result of a speciﬁc event,
namely a public announcement: ‘after some announcement, ϕ’. In
other words, the semantics is: 3ϕ is true if and only if hψiϕ is true
for some ψ; the expression hψiϕ stands for ‘ψ is true and after ψ is
announced, ϕ is true.’ There are some restrictions on ψ. The result-
ing arbitrary announcement logic is axiomatisable and has various
pleasing properties [3].
In the current contribution we investigate some variants of this
arbitrary announcement logic. First, instead of 3ϕ we use a more
speciﬁc operator, namely hGiϕ. Here G is a subgroup of all agents
that simultaneously make a public announcement. In other words,
let G = {1,...,k}, then: hGiϕ is true if and only if there exist
formulae ψ1,...,ψk such that hK1ψ1∧...Kkψkiϕ is true; now, the
expression hK1ψ1 ∧ ...Kkψkiϕ stands for K1ψ1 ∧ ...Kkψk is true
and after agents 1,...,k, simultaneously (and truthfully) announce
ψ1,...,ψk, then ϕ is true’. Note that the remaining agents, not
included in the set G of k agents, are not involved in making the
announcement. The resulting logic is called Group Announcement
Logic (GAL).
Wealsointroduceadifferentlogic, CoalitionAnnouncementLogic
(CAL), with an operator h[G]i instead of hGi or 3. The formula
h[G]iϕ is true if and only if the agents in G can simultaneously an-
nounce something which, regardless of what the remaining agents
simultaneouslyannounce, stillguaranteesthatϕthenbecomestrue.
Informally speaking, both hGiϕ and h[G]iϕ expresses the fact
that coalition G has the ability to make ϕ come about, or that G can
achieve ϕ (under different assumptions about what the other agents
do). Logics modelling the coalitional abilities of agents have been
an active area of research in multi-agent systems in recent years,
the most prominent frameworks being Pauly’s Coalition Logic [9]
and Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman’s Alternating-time Temporal
Logic [2]. The main constructs of these logics are indeed of the
form hGiϕ with the intuitive meaning that coalition G can achieve
ϕ. In this paper we investigate these notions when the actions that
can be performed are truthful public announcements. We present
Group Announcement Logic and Coalition Announcement Logic
in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. First, we brieﬂy review the main
concepts of public announcement logic and coalition logic.
2. BACKGROUND
The restricted space limits us to a somewhat terse review of key
technical deﬁnitions; see the references for discussion and details.
2.1 Public Announcement LogicThe language Lpal of public announcement logic (PAL) [10] over
a set of agents N = {1,...,n} and a set of primitive propositions
Θ is deﬁned as follows, where i is an agent and p ∈ Θ:
ϕ ::= p | Kiϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | [ϕ1]ϕ2
We write hϕ1iϕ2 resp. ˆ Kiϕ for the duals ¬[ϕ1]¬ϕ2 and ¬Ki¬ϕ.
A Kripke structure over N and Θ is a tuple M = (S,∼1,...,∼n,
V) where S is a set of states, ∼i ⊆ S × S is an epistemic indistin-
guishability relation and is assumed to be an equivalence relation
for each agent i, and V : Θ → S assigns primitive propositions to
the states in which they are true. A pointed Kripke structure is a
pair (M,s) where s is a state in M. The interpretation of formulae
in a pointed Kripke structure is deﬁned as follows (the other clauses
are deﬁned in usual truth-functional way).
M,s |= Kiϕ iff for every t such that s ∼i t, M,t |= ϕ
M,s |= [ϕ]ψ iff M,s |= ϕ implies that M|ϕ,s |= ψ
where M|ϕ = (S
0,∼
0
1,...,∼
0
n,V
0) such that S
0 = {s
0 ∈ S :
M,s
0 |= ϕ}; ∼
0
i = ∼i ∩(S
0 × S
0); V
0(p) = V(p) ∩ S
0.
The purely epistemic fragment of the language (i.e., formulae
not containing public announcement operators [ϕ]) is denoted Lel.
It was already shown in Plaza’s original publication on that logic
[10] that the language of PAL is no more expressive than the purely
epistemic fragment.
2.2 Coalition Logic
The language of coalition logic [9] over N and Θ is deﬁned as
follows, where G ⊆ N and p ∈ Θ:
1:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | hGiϕ
An effectivity function over a set of states S is a function E :
2
N → 2
2S
, associating to every coalition the sets of states for which
the coalition is effective. An effectivity function E is N-maximal iff
for all X, if X 6∈ E(∅) then X ∈ E(N); outcome monotonic iff for
all X ⊆ X
0 ⊆ S, if X ∈ E(G) then X
0 ∈ E(G); superadditive iff
for all X1, X2, G1, G2 such that G1 ∩ G2 = ∅, X1 ∈ E(G1) and
X2 ∈ E(G2) imply that X1 ∩ X2 ∈ E(G1 ∪ G2); regular iff for all
G and all X, if X ∈ E(G) then X 6∈ E(G); playable iff (i) for all
G, ∅ 6∈ E(G); (ii) for all G, S ∈ E(G); (iii) E is N-maximal; (iv) E
is outcome-monotonic; (v) E is superadditive. Playability is a key
notion in coalition logic.
A coalition model is a tuple M = (S,E,V), where E associates
a playable effectivity function E(s) over S to each state s, and V is a
propositional valuation over S. Alternatively, we can view a coali-
tion model as assigning a neighbourhood function E(G) : S → 2
2S
to each coalition G. The interpretation of a formula in the combina-
tion of a coalition model and a state is deﬁned as follows (the other
clauses as usual), where ϕ
M = {t : M,t |= ϕ}:
M,s |= hGiϕ iff ϕ
M ∈ E(s)(G)
3. GROUP ANNOUNCEMENT LOGIC
The main construct of the language of Group Announcement Logic
(GAL) is hGiϕ, intuitively meaning that there is some announce-
ment the group G can truthfully make after which ϕ will be true.
1We here use hGi where Pauly [9] uses [G]; to interpret the dia-
mond rather than the box as inclusion in the neighbourhood, con-
trary to the common practice in neighbourhood semantics. The rea-
son for this is that it will make the relationship between coalition
logic and other logics we discuss here clearer.
3.1 Formal Language and Semantics
Assume a set N of n agents and a set Θ of inﬁnitely many primitive
propositions. The language Lgal of GAL is deﬁned by extending
the language of PAL with a new operator hGi for each coalition G:
ϕ ::= p | Kiϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | hGiϕ | [ϕ1]ϕ2
where i is an agent, G is a set of agents and p ∈ Θ. We write [G]ϕ
for the dual ¬hGi¬ϕ and hiiϕ for h{i}iϕ. We will henceforth call
the fragment without public announcement operators Lg.
The interpretation of formulae in a pointed Kripke structure is
deﬁned by extending the deﬁnition for PAL with the following
clause for the new operator:
M,s |= hGiϕ iff for each agent i ∈ G there is a formula ψi ∈ Lel
such that M,s |= h
V
i∈G Kiψiiϕ
We get the following meaning for the dual:
M,s |= [G]ϕ iff for every formula ψi ∈ Lel for every agent i ∈ G,
M,s |= [
V
i∈G Kiψi]ϕ
The deﬁnitions can alternatively be written out in more detail:
M,s |= hGiϕ iff for each agent i ∈ G there is a formula ψi ∈ Lel
such that M,s |=
V
i∈G Kiψi and M|
V
i∈G Kiψi,s |= ϕ
M,s |= [G]ϕ iff for every formula ψi ∈ Lel for every agent i ∈ G,
M,s |=
V
i∈G Kiψi implies that M|
V
i∈G Kiψi,s |= ϕ
Observe that hGi quantiﬁes only over purely epistemic formulae.
The reason for this is as follows. First, in the semantics of hGiϕ the
formulae ψi in
V
i∈G Kiψi cannot be unrestricted Lgal formulas, as
that would make the deﬁnition circular: such a ψi could then be the
formula hGiϕ itself that we are trying to interpret. We therefore
avoid quantifying over formulae containing hGi operators. How-
ever, as the public announcement logic is equally expressive as the
purely epistemic language, the semantics obtained by quantifying
overthefragmentofthelanguagewithouthGioperatorsisthesame
as the semantics obtained by quantifying only over epistemic for-
mulae. In other words, we have that
M,s |= hGiϕ iff for each agent i ∈ G there is a formula ψi ∈ Lpal
such that M,s |= h
V
i∈G Kiψiiϕ
As usual, a formula ϕ is valid, |= ϕ, iff M,s |= ϕ for all M and s.
3.2 Expressivity
GAL includes PAL, but is it more expressive? Or, can hGiϕ
already be expressed in PAL? The following theorem shows that
the answer to the latter question is “no”.
THEOREM 1. GAL is strictly more expressive than PAL.
PROOF. The proof is very similar to the proof that arbitrary pub-
lic announcement logic is strictly more expressive than PAL [3].
GAL is obviously at least as expressive as PAL. For the strictness
part, consider the formula
ξ = ha,b,ci(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap)
Assume that there is a PAL formula equivalent to (i.e., true in ex-
actly the same states) ξ. Since PAL is no more expressive than
standard epistemic logic, there is an Lel formula ψ equivalent to ξ.
ψ can only contain a ﬁnite number of atoms, so let q be an atom
not occurring in ψ. Consider the following model M where agents
b and c knows about p but a does not, and where p is currently true:
•
p
1
a •
¬p
0Consider furthermore the model M
0:
•
p,q
11
a
b
•
¬p,q
01
b
•
p,¬q
10
a •
¬p,¬q
00
where access for c is the identity relation. It is easy to see that
(M,1) 6|= ξ. For the second model, we have that (M
0,10) |=
hKa>∧Kb>∧Kc(p∨q)i(Kap∧¬KbKap), andthusthat(M
010) |= ξ.
However, (M,1)and(M
0,10)arebisimilarwithrespecttotheepis-
temic language not including atom q, thus ψ cannot discern be-
tween these two pointed models and cannot be equivalent to ξ.
3.3 Logical Properties
To sharpen the intuition about the logic we mention some rele-
vantvalidities, withparticularattentiontointeractionbetweengroup
announcement and epistemic modal operators.
PROPOSITION 2 (ELEMENTARY VALIDITIES).
1. hGip → p and hGi¬p → ¬p. Announcements cannot
change the truth value of atomic propositions.
2. h∅iϕ ↔ [∅]ϕ ↔ ϕ. The empty group is powerless
3. hKj1ψjk ∧ ··· ∧ Kjkψjkiϕ → h{j1,...,jk}iϕ
4. ϕ → hGiϕ (Dual of) truth axiom
3.3.1 Whatcanbeachievedbysequencesofannounce-
ments?
Intuitively, hGiϕ means that G can achieve a situation where ϕ is
true in “one step”, by making a joint announcement. One can eas-
ily imagine situations where it could be interesting to reason about
what a group can achieve by making repeated announcements, i.e.,
by a sequence of announcements, one after the other. A general
example is a conversation over an open channel. A particularly in-
teresting property is: “there is some sequence, of arbitrary length,
of announcements by G which will ensure that ϕ becomes true”.
Forarbitraryannouncementlogic, thevalidityoftheprinciple2ϕ →
22ϕ follows from the simple observation that a sequence of two
announcements ψ and χ is equivalent to the single announcement
of ψ ∧ [ψ]χ. Less obvious is that [G]ϕ → [G][G]ϕ is also valid.
PROPOSITION 3. |= [G]ϕ → [G][G]ϕ
PROOF. The diamond version hGihGiϕ → hGiϕ of this va-
lidity makes clear that the requirement is that two successive an-
nouncements by the agents in G simultaneously can also be seen
as a single announcement by the agents in G simultaneously. The
proof is by a purely structural observation. This is surprising: we
will reﬂect after the proof on the difﬁculties of a more obvious at-
tempt to use the language and its semantics.
Consider two successive announcements
V
i∈G Kiϕi and V
i∈G Kiψi. Let a Kripke structure M and a state s in M be given
suchthatM,s |=
V
i∈G Kiϕi, andsimilarly
V
i∈G Kiψi istrueinstate
s in the restriction of M to the
V
i∈G Kiϕi-states: M|
V
i∈G Kiϕi,s |= V
i∈G Kiψi. Given some agent j, the denotation of Kjϕj is a union
N of j-equivalence classes in M that includes the j-class contain-
ing actual state s. The partition for agent j in the resulting model
M|
V
i∈G Kiϕi is clearly the intersection of the domain of
M|
V
i∈G Kiϕi with that union N. Let that new partition be N
0. The
subsequent announcement Kjψj by agent j must again be a union of
j-equivalence classes that includes actual j-class containing actual
state s, but now in the model M|
V
i∈G Kiϕi. This must therefore be
asubsetN
00 ofN
0. Butthatmeansthatagentjcouldinitiallyalready
have announced a proposition of which the denotation is a union
of j-equivalence classes of which the M|
V
i∈G Kiϕi restriction is
that N
00! In other words, agent j initially already knew something
stronger than his ﬁrst announcement, but he only revealed that in
his second announcement. As this holds for all agents, all agents
could initially have announced that stronger proposition. There-
fore, for each agent i there must be formulas χi such that the se-
quence of announcements
V
i∈G Kiϕi and
V
i∈G Kiψi is the same
as a single announcement
V
i∈G Kiχi in the sense that for arbitrary
ϕ: h
V
i∈G Kiϕiih
V
i∈G Kiψiiϕ is equivalent to h
V
i∈G Kiχiiϕ. This
shows that hGihGiϕ ↔ hGiϕ as required.
The curious part of this proof is that it does not construct the re-
quired χi. It merely shows that they exist. It is currently even un-
clear to us what they are. It may be instructive to elaborate. First,
consider two consecutive announcements by a single agent only.
Usingthevalidityforpublicannouncements[ϕ][ψ]χ ↔ [ϕ∧[ϕ]ψ],
we then have that for two successive Kiϕ and Kiψ: Kiϕ∧[Kiϕ]Kiψ
is equivalent to Kiϕ ∧ (Kiϕ → Ki[Kiϕ]ψ) which is equivalent us-
ing some further propositional steps to Ki(ϕ ∧ [Kiϕ]ψ). This has
the proper form of an announcement known by i. For the multi-
agent case the succession of group announcements
V
i∈G Kiϕi and V
i∈G Kiψi can be rewritten to (we omit details) V
i∈G(Kiϕi ∧ (
V
j∈G Kjϕj → Ki[
V
j∈G Kjϕj]ψi). (The problematic
part of this formula, for further reduction, is the
V
j∈G−i Kjϕj part
of
V
j∈G Kjϕj.) This does not imply an obvious formula of form V
i∈G Kiχi.
We thus get yet another interpretation of hGiϕ; namely exactly
the property alluded to above: “there is some sequence, of arbitrary
length, of announcements by G which will ensure that ϕ becomes
true”.
COROLLARY 4. M,s |= hGiϕiffthereisasequenceα1,...,αk
for some k ≥ 1 where for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k, αj = {ψ
j
i : i ∈
G} is a set containing one formula for each agent in G, such
that M,s |= h
V
i∈G Kiψ
1
i i...h
V
i∈G Kiψ
k
i iϕ
In Section 3.5 we discuss a security protocol example involving
sequences of announcements.
3.3.2 Interaction axioms
For arbitrary announcement logic we have that Ki2ϕ → 2Kiϕ,
but not the other way round. Now, we can do more.
PROPOSITION 5. Validities, for arbitrary i and G:
1. Ki[i]ϕ ↔ [i]Kiϕ
2. Ki[G]ϕ → [G]Kiϕ (but not the other way round)
PROOF.
1. 2Kiϕ → Ki2ϕ is false because after going to an i-accessible
state the subsequent model restriction may exclude the actual state.
But for singleton announcements we have an equivalence. This is
becauseanyi-accessiblestatewillbecontainedintheactuali-class.
2. As for arbitrary announcement logic. Note that agent i may but
need not be in group G.
We now proceed to a more systematic treatment of validities.
3.4 Towards an Axiomatisation
We present a sound axiomatisation of group announcement logic
which we also conjecture is complete. The formulation refers to
the necessity forms as introduced by Goldblatt [5]. A necessity
form contains a unique occurrence of a special symbol ]. If ψ issuch a necessity form and ϕ ∈ Lgal, then ψ(ϕ) is obtained from
ψ by substituting ] in ψ for ϕ. The necessity forms are inductively
deﬁned as follows. Let ϕ ∈ Lgal. Then: ] is a nec. form; if ψ is
a nec. form then (ϕ → ψ) is a nec. form; if ψ is a nec. form then
[ϕ]ψ is a nec. form; if ψ is a nec. form then Kaψ is a nec. form.
Pϕ denotes the set of primitive propositions occurring in ϕ. The
axiomatisation GAL is given in Table 1.
instant. of prop. tautologies
Ka(ϕ → ψ) → (Kaϕ → Kaψ) distr. of kn. over impl.
Kaϕ → ϕ truth
Kaϕ → KaKaϕ positive introspection
¬Kaϕ → Ka¬Kaϕ negative introspection
[ϕ]p ↔ (ϕ → p) atomic permanence
[ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ → ¬[ϕ]ψ) ann. and negation
[ϕ](ψ ∧ χ) ↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ) ann. and conjunction
[ϕ]Kaψ ↔ (ϕ → Ka[ϕ]ψ) ann. and knowledge
[ϕ][ψ]χ ↔ [ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ]χ ann. composition
[B]ϕ → [
V
a∈B Kaψa]ϕ where ψa ∈ Lel group and speciﬁc ann.
From ϕ and ϕ → ψ, infer ψ modus ponens
From ϕ, infer Kaϕ nec. of knowledge
From ϕ, infer [ψ]ϕ nec. of announcement
From ϕ, infer [B]ϕ nec. of arb. ann.
From ϕ([p]ψ), infer ϕ([B]ψ) deriving group ann.
where p 6∈ Pϕ ∪ Pψ (a.k.a. R([B]))
Table 1: The sound axiomatisation GAL
PROPOSITION 6. The axiomatisation GAL is sound.
PROOF. All axioms and rules are sound. For the soundness of
the rule R([B]), we refer to soundness of the rule R(2) in [3].
3.5 Example: Security Protocols
In security protocols a sender and a receiver attempt to commu-
nicate a secret to each other without an eavesdropper learning it.
A very powerful eavesdropper is one that intercepts all communi-
cations. This creates the setting where sender, receiver, and eaves-
dropper are three agents that can be modelled in a multi-S5 system
and where all communications are public announcements by sender
and receiver. One speciﬁc example of such a setting is known as the
Russian Cards Problem [12]. The setting is one where a pack of all
different cards are distributed over the three ‘players’, where every
playeronlyknowshisowncards, wheresenderandreceiverhavean
informational advantage over the eavesdropper because they hold
more cards, and where the ‘secrets’ that should not be divulged are
card ownership. Posed as a riddle it looks as follows—Anne and
Bill are sender and receiver, Cath the eavesdropper:
From a pack of seven known cards 0,1,2,3,4,5,6
Anne and Bill each draw three cards and Cath gets the
remaining card. How can Anne and Bill openly (pub-
licly)informeachotherabouttheircards, withoutCath
learning from any of their cards who holds it?
To simplify matters, assume that Anne has drawn {0,1,2}, that
Bill has drawn {3,4,5} and that Cath therefore has card 6. The
initial Kripke model describing this setting consists of all possi-
ble card deals (valuations). In that model an epistemic class for an
agent can be identiﬁed with the hand of cards of that agent. For ex-
ample, given that Anne holds {0,1,2}, she cannot distinguish the
four deals—allow us to use some suggestive notation—012.345.6,
012.346.5, 012.356.4, and 012.456.3 from one another.
Given that all announcements that can be made by a player are
known by that player, they consist of unions of equivalence classes
for that player and can therefore be identiﬁed with sets of alterna-
tive hands for that player. One solution is where Anne says “My
hand of cards is one of 012,034,056,135,246” and where Bill af-
ter that says “My hand of cards is one of 345,125,024” (the last
is equivalent in that information state to Bill saying “Cath has card
6”). Anne and Bill in fact execute a protocol here, not in the sense
of sets of sequences of announcements but in the sense of functions
from local states of agents to nondeterministic choice between an-
nouncements. For example, Anne is executing “given cards i,j,k,
the ﬁrst of my ﬁve hands is that actual hand ijk; the second of my
ﬁve hands to announce is ikl where k,l are chosen from the ﬁve
remaining cards; the third is imn where m,n are the remaining two
cards; etc...; shufﬂe the hands before announcing them.”
We can describe this solution in logic. Agent a stands for Anne,
b for Bill, and c for Cath. Let qi stand for ‘agent i holds card
q’ and let klmi stand for ki ∧ li ∧ mi. The information require-
ments are that Anne learns Bill’s cards (the conjunction suggests
all hands):
V
ijk(ijkb → Kaijkb) (one); and that Bill learns Anne’s
cards:
V
ijk(ijka → Kbijka) (two). And the safety / security re-
quirements are that Cath does not learn the ownership of any card
(except her own card):
V6
q=0((qa → ¬Kcqa) ∧ (qb → ¬Kcqb))
(three). All protocols are ﬁnite, because the model is ﬁnite and all
informative announcements result in actual model restriction. But
it is unclear how long such protocols need to be. That uncertain
but ﬁnite length cannot be described in public announcement logic.
But (overlooking the intermediate requirements for safety for the
moment) the existence of a protocol can be described in group an-
nouncement logic, because the diamond in habiϕ may refer to ar-
bitrarily ﬁnite length protocols taking place between sender a and
receiver b in the presence of other agents, such as the eavesdropper,
as was discussed in Section 3.3.1.
Let’s see how this works for the length-two protocol above that
solves the Russian Cards Problem. First, we model the solution in
public announcement logic. In the solution, ﬁrst Anne announces
012a ∨ 034a ∨ 056a ∨ 135a ∨ 246a (anne). Then Bill announces
345b ∨ 125b ∨ 024b (bill). After these two announcements the so-
lution requirements are satisﬁed.
012.345.6 |= hKaanneihKbbilli(one ∧ two ∧ three)
Now instead of Anne and Bill taking turns in speaking, we can
also see them as operating simultaneously, where Bill ‘thinks’ true
during Anne’s announcement and vice versa. We then get
012.345.6 |= hKaanne ∧ Kb>ihKa> ∧ Kbbilli(one ∧ two ∧ three)
In GAL we thus have
012.345.6 |= habihabi(one ∧ two ∧ three)
The signiﬁcance of this is that it says that there exists an announce-
ment a can make such that after that there exists an announce-
ment b can make, after which the goal will be achieved. This
is exactly the type of property one would want to model check
against the description of a system – one would typically want
to check whether there exist some successful announcement rather
than checking whether a particular announcement is successful.
By Proposition 3 we also get that
012.345.6 |= habi(one ∧ two ∧ three)
Bysuccessivelyreplacingtwoannouncementsbyasingleannounce-
ment we can of course capture any ﬁnite-length execution sequence
between a sender and receiver in this way as ‘some terminal condi-tion ϕ sender and receiver can achieve by collaborating’ expressed
in habiϕ form.
The above is merely one execution sequence. The ability to ex-
change a secret depends on the ability to produce such a sequence
by (typically) random choice between many other protocol execu-
tions. Also, the initial state may not be the hand of cards {0,1,2}
but any other hand. For example, a different execution to “My
hand of cards is one of 012,034,056,135,246” is “My hand of
cards is one of 012,035,046,134,256”, to which corresponds a
different subsequent b-announcement. But that would simply con-
stitute a different way to achieve postcondition one ∧ two ∧ three
similarly captured by the truth of habi(one ∧ two ∧ three) in state
012.345.6 of the initial information state. And conditionalising for
Anne’s means shifting to the model perspective: the requirement
that “habi(one∧two∧three) is valid in the initial card deal model”
corresponds to “there is a protocol for Anne and Bill to safely ex-
change their secrets”. Clearly, this also holds for protocols con-
sisting of more than two announcements, and for secrets and safety
requirements other than one ∧ two ∧ three.
One must be careful when interpreting the meaning the existence
of sequences of announcements. If we can replace the two suc-
cessive announcements: Anne says “My hand of cards is one of
012,034,056,135,246” after which Bill says “My hand of cards
is one of 345,125,024”, by a single one, does that not mean that all
protocols can be reduced to length 1? And what would in this case
that single simultaneous announcement be? Well: as both agents
are announcing facts and not knowledge, their single announce-
ment is simply the conjunction of their successive announcements.
As the second one for Anne and the ﬁrst one for Bill was ‘true’
(vacuous), this means that they could simultaneously have made
their successive announcements: Anne says “My hand of cards
is one of 012,034,056,135,246” and simultaneously Bill says
“My hand of cards is one of 345,125,024”. Unfortunately, even
though this indeed solves the problem, the agents do not know
the public consequences of their joint action merely from the pub-
lic consequences of their individual part in it. More concretely:
a different execution of the protocol for Anne, when she holds
cards {0,1,2}, is the announcement “My hand of cards is one of
012,035,046,134,256”. From that with Bill’s above announce-
ment Cath can deduce straightaway that the card deal is 012.345.6.
And, obviously, Bill does not know whether Anne is going to an-
nounce the original or the alternative set of ﬁve hands, and any of
many others. In epistemic terms: although the knowledge post-
conditions are met by the above simultaneous announcements, the
agents do not know that before the announcement, and consider it
possible that an infelicitous combination instead may occur. The
subtleties of ability under incomplete information are further dis-
cussed in Section 3.6 below.
We conclude, that habi(one∧two∧three) is a necessary but not
sufﬁcient property to ensure the existence of a safe protocol to re-
alize security postconditions. But this is already an achievement:
we do not know of a logical language that can express this so suc-
cinctly. In public announcement logic, for a ﬁnite model we would
need a very long, deeply nested modal formula; where ‘deep’ is
really deep: in the order of the number of states of the model. For
inﬁnite models, it cannot be expressed at all in that logic.
3.6 Announcements and Ability
Our initial intuitive interpretation of a formula of the form hCiϕ
was that coalition C has the ability to make ϕ come about by mak-
ing some public announcement. We now have a better understand-
ing of group announcement logic; let us discuss to what extent that
intuition is precise.
Recent work on strategy logics have illuminated the fact that
there are many subtly different notions of ability in the context of
incomplete information [6, 8, 1, 7] (see [7] for a recent summary).
[7, p. 433] discuss three levels of ability in general strategy log-
ics, which we now discuss counterparts to in the special context of
truthful public announcements
2. For simplicity we consider a sin-
gleton coalition {a}. What does it mean that agent a has the ability
to make a goal ϕ come about by making a public announcement?
Let us begin with the weakest form of ability.
Being able to, but not necessarily knowing it.
The formula haiϕ means that there is something which a knows,
and if the fact that a knows it is announced, ϕ is a consequence.
However, it might be the case that a doesn’t know this, i.e., that
Kahaiϕ is not true. As an example, ﬁrst observe that hKaψaiϕ →
KahKaψaiϕ is not a principle of public announcement logic. As a
counter-example take state s of the following model
•
p
s
a
•
¬p
t
and take ψa = > and ϕ = p. However, this does not mean that
a cannot achieve ϕ in all her accessible states by some other an-
nouncements (possibly different ones in different states). But in
group announcement logic, we have in the model above that s |=
haip (a can announce Ka>), but t 6|= haip and thus, s |= ¬Kahaip.
So, haiϕ → Kahaiϕ is not a principle of group announcement
logic. This is a ﬁrst illustration of the fact that we must be care-
ful when using the term “ability”: in some (but not necessarily all)
circumstances it might be counter-intuitive to say that a has the
ability make ϕ come about, when she is not aware that she is; when
she cannot discern between the actual situation and a situation in
which she does not have this ability.
Being able to, knowing that, but not knowing how.
Consider the following model and formula:
•
¬p,q
u
2
2
•
p,¬q
v
2
•
p,q
s
1
•
p,q
t
ϕ = K2q ∧ (¬K2p ∨ ˆ K1(K2p ∧ ¬K2q))
If we take the current state to be s, we have a situation where 1
is able to make ϕ come about and where she in addition knows
this; a stronger type of ability than in the example above. For-
mally: s |= h1iϕ, because s |= hK1qiϕ, and t |= h1iϕ because
t |= hK1piϕ. Thus, s |= K1h1iϕ. However, we argue, it might still
be counter-intuitive to say that 1 can make ϕ come about in this
situation. The reason is that she has to use different announce-
ments in indiscernible states. Observe that s |= hK1pi¬ϕ and
t |= hK1qi¬ϕ: while the same announcements can be made in
both states, they don’t have the same consequences. In fact, there
exists no single announcement agent 1 can make which will ensure
that ϕ will be true in both s and t. To see this, we can enumerate the
possible models resulting from 1 making an announcement in s or
t. Because such a model must include 1’s equivalence class {s,t},
there are four possibilities. First, the starting model itself (e.g., 1
announces a tautology), in which ϕ does not hold in s. Second, the
model where only state u is removed (e.g., 1 announces K1p), in
2This special case is considerably different from the case of arbi-
trary actions which is normally studied in the context of strategy
logics. In particular, the state transition for a given action (an-
nouncement) is deterministic, which implies, e.g., that the question
of whether strategies are uniform or not is moot.which ϕ does not hold in s (as we saw above). Third, the model
where only state v is removed (e.g., 1 announces K1q), in which ϕ
does not hold in t (as we saw above). Fourth, the model where both
u and v are removed, in which ϕ holds in neither s nor t.
Since agent 1 cannot discern state s from state t, she has the
ability to make ϕ come about only in the sense that she depends on
guessing the correct announcement. In other words, she can make
ϕ come about, knows that she can make ϕ come about, but does
not know how to make ϕ come about.
Being able to, knowing that, knowing how.
Thus, we can formulate a strong notion of the ability of a to achieve
ϕ by public announcements: there exists a formula ψ such that a
knows ψ and in any state a considers possible, hKaψaiϕ holds.
Comparethisversionofability, “thereisanannouncementwhich
a knows will achieve the goal”, with the previous version above,
“a knows that there is an announcement which will achieve the
goal”. We can call these notions knowing de re, and knowing de
dicto, respectively, that the goal can be achieved, following [8] who
use the same terminology (after the corresponding notion used in
quantiﬁed modal logic) for general strategy logics. Note, however,
that it is not prima facie clear that there is a distinction between
these notions in GAL, because of the intimate interaction between
knowledge and possible actions (announcements), but the model
and formula above show that there indeed is.
It can be argued that all of these notions of ability are useful, but
it is of importance to discern between them.
More than one agent.
In the case of more than one agent, there are even more subtleties.
In particular, what does it mean that a group know how to achieve
something, i.e., which joint announcement will be effective? That
everybody knows it? That they have common knowledge of it?
In [8] it is argued that the answer depends on the situation. It
might be the case that the agents have common knowledge (al-
though they then need some resolution mechanism for cases when
there are more than one effective announcement, in order to coordi-
nate); that every agent knows the effective announcement; that the
agents have distributed knowledge about the effective announce-
ment and thus can pool their knowledge together to ﬁnd out what
they should do; that a particular agent (the “leader”) knows the ef-
fective announcement and can communicate it to the others.
3.7 Coalition Logic and Neighbourhood Sem.
We now discuss the relationship between GAL and coalition
logic, and neighbourhood semantics for GAL in general.
PROPOSITION 7. WhenG1∩G2 = ∅, thefollowingisnotvalid:
(S) (hG1iϕ1 ∧ hG2iϕ2) → hG1 ∪ G2i(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
PROOF. Let M be the following model.
•
¬p,q
t
2
•
p,q
s
1 •
p,¬q
u
We have that M,s |= h1i(K2p∧¬K1q) (1 can announce K1p), and
that M,s |= h2i(K1q ∧ ¬K2p) (2 can announce K2q), but not that
h1,2i(K2p ∧ ¬K1q ∧ K1q ∧ ¬K2p).
The following is immediate, as coalition logic contains (S).
COROLLARY 8. Coalition logic is not contained in group an-
nouncement logic.
Letusnowdiscussthemeaningofthegroupannouncementlogic
operator hGi in the context of neighbourhood semantics. For sim-
plicity we will here only consider the language without the regular
public announcement operators: for the rest of this section the lan-
guage Lg is assumed.
In order to be able to interpret the epistemic modalities, we must
extendcoalitionmodelswithindistinguishabilityrelations. Anepis-
temiccoalitionmodel(ECM)isatupleM = (S,E,V,∼1,...,∼n),
where (S,E,V) is a coalition model and each ∼i is an epistemic in-
distinguishability relation. We can use ECMs to interpret our coali-
tion operators exactly as in coalition logic:
M,s |=e hGiϕ ⇔ ϕ
M ∈ E(s)(G)
(and as usual for the other operators; we use the subscript on |=e
to discern between the two interpretations). We can thus say that
a pointed Kripke structure (M,s) and a pointed ECM (M,s
0) are
equivalent iff they satisfy the same formulae, i.e., if for all ϕ,
M,s |= ϕ ⇔ M,s
0 |=e ϕ (1)
COROLLARY 9. It is not the case that for every pointed Kripke
structure there is an equivalent pointed epistemic coalition model.
PROOF. It is easy to see that if the (S) axiom does not hold in a
pointed epistemic effectivity model, then the underlying effectivity
function is not superadditive.
While we cannot use playable effectivity functions to interpret
GAL formulae, let us see if we can relax the playability require-
ments to obtain an equivalent neighbourhood semantics. Let a gen-
eral epistemic coalition model (GECM) be deﬁned as a ECM, ex-
cept that the effectivity function does not need to be playable.
First, let us look at equivalence on the model level: we say that a
Kripke structure M and a GECM M are equivalent when M |= ϕ
iff M |=e ϕ (i.e., when M,s |= ϕ for all states s in M iff M,s
0 |=e
ϕ for all states s
0 in M) for all formulae ϕ.
PROPOSITION 10. There does not exist an equivalent general
epistemic coalition model for every Kripke structure.
PROOF. Take a Kripke model M with two states s,t; p is true
only in s; agent 2 can discern between s and t while agent 1 cannot.
Let γ = h2i(K1p ∨ K1¬p). Suppose that the epistemic effectivity
model M is equivalent to M. We have that M,s |= γ (2 can an-
nounce K2p) and that M,t |= γ (2 can announce K2¬p) and thus
that M |= γ and, from equivalence, that M |=e γ. Let s
0 be an
arbitrary state in M. Since M,s
0 |=e γ, we have that (K1p ∨
K1¬p)
M ∈ E(s
0)(2). But we also have that M |= ¬(K1p∨K1¬p),
so M |=e ¬(K1p ∨ K1¬p) and (K1p ∨ K1¬p)
M = ∅ ∈ E(s
0)(2).
But we also have that ⊥
M = ∅, so M,s
0 |=e h2i⊥. Since s
0
was arbitrary, we have that M |=e h2i⊥, which again implies that
M |= h2i⊥ which is not the case. Thus, M and M cannot be equiv-
alent.
A consequenceof Proposition 10is that given aKripke model M,
there does not always exist a GECM M such that for every state
s in M there exists a state s
0 in M such that (M,s) and (M,s
0)
satisfy exactly the same formulae, and vice versa (if that was the
case, then M and M would also be equivalent on the model level).
In particular, we cannot in general deﬁne an effectivity function
(with any properties) over the state space of a given Kripke model
and get an equivalent interpretation of formulae at all the states.
As the counter-example in the proof of Proposition 10 shows, the
Kripke structure might not contain “enough” states. But in fact, any
Kripke structure can be extended in a very simple way to a struc-
ture over which we can deﬁne an equivalent effectivity function,
without changing satisﬁability at any of the original states. Simply
take the power model consisting of the union of all subsets of theoriginal Kripke model. Formally, the power model ˆ M of a Kripke
model M is deﬁned as follows. A submodel of a Kripke model M
is a model where the states are a subset of the states in M, and the
valuation function and indistinguishability relations are restrictions
of those in M to the state space of the submodel. The power model
ˆ M of M is obtained by taking the disjoint union of M and every
proper submodel of M, after renaming the states of the proper sub-
models such that the state spaces are disjoint. A simple example
of a power model is shown in Figure 1. We say that two pointed
Kripke models are equivalent iff they satisfy the same formulae.
M: •
p
s
1
•
¬p
t
ˆ M: •
p
s
1
•
¬p
t •
p
s1 •
¬p
t1
Figure 1: A Kripke model M and its power model ˆ M
PROPOSITION 11. For any state s of any Kripke structure M,
(M,s) and (ˆ M,s) are equivalent.
PROOF. Immediate, sincethereisnoaccessbetweenthedisjoint
subsets in the power model.
Given a Kripke structure M, we deﬁne the induced GECM
M
M = (ˆ S,E, ˆ V, ˆ ∼1,..., ˆ ∼n)
such that ˆ M = (ˆ S, ˆ V, ˆ ∼1,..., ˆ ∼n) is the power model of M and
X ∈ E(s)(G) ⇔ ∃ϕ : ϕ
ˆ M ⊆ X and ˆ M,s |= hGiϕ
for any G and s ∈ ˆ S.
THEOREM 12. ForanyM andstatesin ˆ M, (ˆ M,s)and(M
M,s)
are equivalent.
Thus, whilewecannotgetequivalenceonthemodellevelevenwith
general effectivity functions (Prop. 10), we can get equivalence on
the level of pointed models: given a pointed Kripke model (M,s),
the pointed GECM (M
M,s) satisﬁes exactly the same formulae.
EXAMPLE 13. Let M be the model in Figure 1. We have that
E(s)(2) = { X ⊆ {s,t,s1,t1} : s ∈ X or s1 ∈ X}
In other words: in s 2 can make an announcement such that any
formula true in s or s1 (and maybe in some other states as well)
is still true after the announcement. We have for example in s that
agent 2 can make an announcement such that 1 gets to know p. In
the two different semantics: M,s |= K2p and M|K2p,s |= K1p ⇒
M,s |= h2iK1p; and {s1} ∈ E(s)(2) ⇒ (K1p)
MM
∈ E(s)(2) ⇒
M
M,s |=e h2iK1p. Here are some other examples of members
of E(s)(2) with corresponding announcements (by agent 2) and a
formula ϕ true after the announcement such that ϕ
ˆ M is the set:
Set Announcement Formula
{s} > p ∧ ¬K1p
{s,s1} > K2p
{s,t1} > p ∧ ¬K1p ∨ ¬p ∧ K1¬p
{s1} K2p K1p
{s1,t1} K2p K1p ∨ K1¬p
...
Let us consider the properties of the induced effectivity function.
We call an effectivity function recursive if it is the case that a coali-
tionGiseffectiveforasetofoutcomesX ifandonlyifitiseffective
for the set of outcomes in which it is effective for X: X ∈ E(s)(G)
iff {s
0 | X ∈ E(s
0)(G)} ∈ E(s)(G).
PROPOSITION 14. TheeffectivityfunctionoftheinducedGECM
is N-maximal, outcome-monotonic and recursive.
4. COALITIONANNOUNCEMENTLOGIC
In group announcement logic hGiϕ means that G can jointly
make some announcement such that ϕ will be true. We now in-
troduce and brieﬂy discuss Coalition Announcement Logic (CAL),
in which h[G]iϕ means that G can jointly make some announcement
such that no matter what announcements the other agents make, ϕ
will become true.
4.1 Language and Semantics
The language Lcal of CAL over a set N of n agents and a set Θ
of primitive propositions is deﬁned by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | Kiϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | h[G]iϕ | [ϕ1]ϕ2
where G is a set of agents and p ∈ Θ. We use Lc to refer to the
fragment without public announcement operators. The semantics
is deﬁned as follows (the other clauses as before).
M,s |= h[G]iϕ iff for every agent i ∈ G there exists a formula
ψi ∈ Lel such that for every formula ψj ∈ Lel for each of the
agents j 6∈ G we have that M,s |=
V
i∈G Kiψi∧[K1ψ1∧···∧
Knψn]ϕ
h[G]i denotes a ∃∀ pattern of quantiﬁers. Note that in the deﬁnition
thesecondquantiﬁerisoverallpossibleformulaeforagentsoutside
G, but the use of the “box” version of the public announcement
operator ensures that only the formulae actually known by those
agents plays a role. To understand the semantics better it might be
instructive to look at the dual [hGi]ϕ ≡ ¬h[G]i¬ϕ:
M,s |= [hGi]ϕ iff for all formulae ψi ∈ Lel for every agent i ∈ G
there is a formula ψj ∈ Lel for each of the agents j 6∈ G, such
that M,s |=
V
i∈G Kiψi implies that M,s |= hK1ψ1 ∧ ··· ∧
Knψniϕ
Thus, [hGi]ϕ means that coalition G cannot avoid ϕ – no matter
what she (truthfully) announces, the rest of the agents can choose
some announcement such that ϕ will be true.
The formula h[G]iϕ cannot be expressed in PAL:
THEOREM 15. CAL is strictly more expressive than PAL.
PROOF. With N = {a,b,c}, observing that M,s |= h[N]iϕ iff
M,s |= hNiϕ, the proof of Theorem 1 also proves this case.
4.2 Properties
If the grand coalition can make an announcement after which ϕ
follows, then it has the ability to achieve ϕ:
(PAN) hK1ψ1 ∧ ··· ∧ Knψniϕ → h[N]iϕ
is a valid schema. To see this, observe the meaning of h[N]i:
M,s |= h[N]iϕ iff there exist formulae ψ1,...,ψn ∈ Lel such that
M,s |= hK1ψ1 ∧ ··· ∧ Knψniϕ
Note that (PAN) does not hold in general if we substitute other
coalitions for N.
If the empty coalition has the ability to achieve ϕ, then ϕ will be
true after any public announcement by the grand coalition:
(PA∅) h[∅]iϕ → [K1ψ1 ∧ ··· ∧ Knψn]ϕ
is a valid schema. To see this, observe the meaning of h[∅]i:
M,s |= h[∅]iϕ iff for all formulae ψ1,...,ψn ∈ Lel, M,s |=
[K1ψ1 ∧ ··· ∧ Knψn]ϕ
Here is one interaction axiom relating coalitional and epistemic
operators:PROPOSITION 16. h[G]iˆ Kiϕ → ˆ Kih[G]iϕ is valid, for any i and G
Thepropertiesmentionedsofarrelateabilitytopublicannounce-
ments and to knowledge. Moving on to more general properties of
ability, we have the following axioms and rules of coalition logic
[9], all valid and validity preserving:
(⊥) ¬h[G]i⊥ (>) h[G]i>
(N) (¬h[∅]i¬ϕ → h[N]iϕ) (M) h[G]i(ϕ ∧ ψ) → h[G]iψ
(S) (h[G1]iϕ1 ∧ h[G2]iϕ2) → h[G1 ∪ G2]i(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) G1 ∩ G2 = ∅
(E)
ϕ↔ψ
h [G] iϕ↔h [G] iψ (MP)
ϕ,ϕ→ψ
ψ
So coalition logic is embedded in coalitional public announce-
ment logic; every theorem of the former is a theorem of the latter.
In addition, unlike in coalition logic we have the following (valid):
(P) h[G]ip ↔ p
We immediately get a lower bound on the complexity of the sat-
isﬁability problem for CAL.
THEOREM 17. The sat. problem for CAL is PSPACE-hard.
PROOF. Followsimmediatelyfromthefactthesatisﬁabilityprob-
lem for coalition logic is PSPACE-hard [9] and can be reduced to
satisﬁability in CAL since coalition logic is included in CAL.
4.3 Example
For a brief example, consider once more the model M in Fig-
ure 1, where agent 1 cannot distinguish between p and not p, but
agent 2 can, and where this is common knowledge. Suppose that
p is actually true. In CAL, we now have that 1 cannot guaran-
tee either knowledge of p or persisting ignorance of p. Clearly,
agent 1 cannot make any informative announcement, but agent 2
can choose whether just to announce ‘true’ or to announce p. In the
ﬁrst case, 1’s ignorance of p persists, whereas in the second case,
1 will learn that p. In other words, agent 1 has hardly any ‘pow-
ers’ at all. Formally, we have that M,s 6|= h[1]iK1p because M,s |=
hK1>∧K2>i¬K1p but also that M,s 6|= h[1]i(ˆ K1p∧ˆ K1¬p) because
M,s |= hK1>∧K2piK1p. On the other hand, agent 2’s powers are,
of course, much larger. He can decide whether to let agent 1 learn
p or not, a feat they obviously also can achieve together; therefore
M |= h[2]i(K1p ∨ K1¬p) as well as M |= h[1,2]i(K1p ∨ K1¬p).
Thesecurityprotocolexample, whenappliedtotheRussianCards
Problem, is another application of coalition announcement logic –
but for this speciﬁc application in a less interesting sense: obvi-
ously, whatever information eavesdropper Cath publicly provides
will be to her disadvantage. Therefore, whatever sender and re-
ceiver (Anne and Bill) can achieve with Cath keeping quiet al-
though still listening (as in GAL) they will also be able to achieve
with Cath simultaneously announcing at will (as in CAL). In other
words, we still have that 012.345.6 |= h[ab]i(one ∧ two ∧ three).
4.4 Neighbourhood Semantics
Neighbourhood semantics is particularly interesting for CAL,
because of the close connection to coalition logic. Again, we will
hereonlyconsiderthelanguageLc withoutregularpublicannounce-
ment operators.
The equivalent of Proposition 11 still holds CAL:
M,s |= ϕ ⇔ ˆ M,s |= ϕ
foranystatesinM andanyϕ, where ˆ M isthepowermodelofM. In
this case we deﬁne the induced general epistemic coalition model
of a given Kripke structure M to be M
M = (ˆ S,E, ˆ V, ˆ ∼1,..., ˆ ∼n)
where ˆ M = (ˆ S, ˆ V, ˆ ∼1,..., ˆ ∼n) is the power model of M and
X ∈ E(s)(G) ⇔
(
∃ϕ : ϕ
ˆ M ⊆ X and ˆ M,s |= hGiϕ G 6= N
∀ϕ : (ϕ
ˆ M ⊆ ˆ S \ X ⇒ ˆ M,s 6|= h[∅]iϕ) G = N
for any G and s ∈ ˆ S. We can now prove the equivalent to Theorem
12, and consider the properties of the induced effectivity function.
THEOREM 18. ForanyM andstatesin ˆ M, (ˆ M,s)and(M
M,s)
are equivalent.
PROPOSITION 19. TheeffectivityfunctionintheinducedGECM
is playable.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Our goal has been to shed some light on the notion of coali-
tional ability by public announcements. Clearly, there are plenty
of open questions. Of particular interests are complete axiomatisa-
tions of the two logics, and a formal comparison of their relative ex-
pressiveness, as well as a comparison with arbitrary announcement
logic [3] – in particular in regards to expressiveness. We have seen
that each of the two logics can be interpreted using general epis-
temic coalition models – complete descriptions of the properties of
the two classes of such models are however missing. The neigh-
bourhood semantics can be extended to the language including the
public announcement operators, but that would require some kind
of identiﬁcation of the elements of the effectivity function with ac-
tual announcements. We note that a similar construction can be
used to get a neighbourhood semantics for arbitrary announcement
logic. Issues of computational complexity should also be studied.
Another future direction is to add common knowledge.
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